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Abstract 
 
 A growing literature reports the conclusions that: (a) expected utility theory does not provide a 
plausible theory of risk aversion for both small-stakes and large-stakes gambles; and (b) this 
decision theory should be replaced with an alternative theory characterized by loss aversion. This 
paper explains that the arguments in previous literature fail to support these conclusions. Either 
concavity calibration has no general implication for expected utility theory or it has problematic 
implications for all decision theories that involve concave transformations (utility or value 
functions) of positive money payoffs, which makes loss aversion irrelevant to the argument.  
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1. Introduction 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) developed a theory of utility as an essential 
component of a theory of play for strategic games. Their utility theory, now known as expected 
utility theory, is based on a set of axioms for a preference ordering of probability distributions of 
“prizes.” The set of axioms includes the independence axiom which gives an expected utility 
functional representing the axioms its defining characteristic of linearity in probabilities. It was 
clearly understood in classic work (e.g., Luce and Raiffa, 1957, Ch. 2) that the axioms do not 
specify the identity of the prizes, such as scalar amounts of terminal wealth or income or, 
alternatively, commodity vectors. A difference in the assumed identity of the prizes is the 
characteristic that distinguishes one expected utility model from another. Failure in recent 
literature to distinguish between expected utility theory  all models based on a set of axioms 
that includes the independence axiom  and a specific expected utility model has led to incorrect 
conclusions.  
For example, Rabin and Thaler (2001, p. 221)  building on earlier work by Rabin 
(2000)  state that they “… establish the implausibility of expected utility theory by showing 
that absurd large-stakes risk aversion … follow inherently from non-negligible modest-scale risk 
aversion ….” Validity of this Rabin-Thaler conclusion has been accepted in the academic 
literature (Kahneman, 2003; Camerer and Thaler, 2003) and general readership literature (The 
Economist, 2001) and in the award literature for the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences 
(Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 2002, p. 16).  
This paper explains that the concavity-calibration argument, as developed by Rabin 
(2000), does not logically support the implausibility conclusion about expected utility theory. Our 
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explanation in section 2 begins with the original Rabin (2000) assumption that an agent will reject 
a 50-50 small-stakes gamble at all positive initial wealth levels. The section 2 explanation 
continues by providing: (a) an accessible demonstration that this small-stakes risk aversion 
assumption and globally-concave utility do imply implausible large-stakes risk aversion for the 
expected utility of terminal wealth model (see Rabin, 2000 for an original proof); and (b) a 
counterexample to illustrate that the small-stakes risk aversion assumption and global concavity 
do not imply implausible large-stakes risk aversion for the expected utility of income model. 
Since this small-stakes risk aversion assumption of Rabin (2000) does not imply implausible 
large-stakes risk aversion for the expected utility of income model, the conclusion by Rabin and 
Thaler (2001) that their arguments “establish the implausibility of expected utility theory” does 
not stand. Rubinstein (2001, 2004) presents a critique in a similar spirit. 
The expected utility of income model is widely used in the theory of auctions. 1 However, 
the model does not provide an explanation of how an agent’s initial wealth affects its attitude 
towards risk. In order to be able to analyze the effects of initial wealth on risk-taking behavior, 
one needs a model in which risk attitude does depend on initial wealth. In order for a model to 
withstand the Rabin critique, initial wealth must not be additive to income in the utility function. 
This is our motivation for introducing, in section 3, an expected utility model in which the 
arguments of the utility function are ordered pairs of initial wealth and income. To demonstrate 
that this new model, the expected utility of initial wealth and income model, may have fruitful 
applications we extend the Arrow (1971) and Pratt (1964) characterization of comparative risk 
aversion to it. The new expected utility model is not subject to Rabin’s (2000) critique because 
his risk aversion assumption does not imply implausible large-stakes risk aversion for this model, 
as we illustrate with a counterexample. 
 Explaining that Rabin’s (2000) small-stakes risk aversion assumption has no general 
implication for expected utility theory is the first topic addressed. Another topic addressed in this 
paper is exploring general implications of concavity calibration for decision theory. Many 
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decision theories with “utility functionals” that are not linear in probabilities involve concave 
transformations (utility or value functions) of positive money payoffs, and therefore they may be 
vulnerable to an extended concavity calibration critique. Section 4 addresses this question. We 
present a more-general concavity calibration proposition that does not assume linearity in 
probabilities. Using this concavity calibration result, we identify an alternative small-stakes risk 
aversion assumption that implies that decision theories which involve concave transformations of 
positive money payoffs have implausible large-stakes risk aversion. Whether or not this pattern of 
small-stakes risk aversion has empirical validity is a question best addressed elsewhere, but the 
analysis of its implications demonstrates the following insights. The logic of concavity calibration 
has no special implication for expected utility theory. The implications for decision theory of the 
issues raised by Rabin are either much narrower or much broader than Rabin’s (2000) and 
Rabin’s and Thaler’s (2001) conclusions suggest. Either concavity calibration has no general 
implication for expected utility theory (if only the Rabin calibration is considered), or there are 
problematic implications for any decision theory that involves concave transformation of positive 
money payoffs (if other calibrations, such as ours in section 4, are considered). In the latter case, 
expected utility theory, cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and other 
decision theories are subjected to a concavity-calibration critique. Furthermore, loss aversion is 
not a solution to the problems for decision theory that may follow from concavity calibration 
because our alternative small-stakes risk aversion assumption (in section 4) holds in the domain 
of positive money payoffs, which makes loss aversion irrelevant to the argument.2 This finding 
contradicts a conclusion by Rabin and Thaler (2001, p. 230) that loss aversion is a “key 
component” of a decision theory that can survive concavity calibration critique.  
 
2. Implications of the Rabin Risk Aversion Assumption for Expected Utility Theory  
In this section we re-examine the Rabin-Thaler (2001) conclusion, based on Rabin’s 
(2000) calibration, that their arguments “…establish the implausibility of expected utility 
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theory…” We provide straightforward demonstrations that Rabin’s assumed pattern of small-
stakes risk aversion: (a) does imply implausible large-stakes risk aversion for the expected utility 
of terminal wealth model; but (b) does not have an analogous implausible risk aversion 
implication for the expected utility of income model.  
Rabin’s (2000) analysis of the implications of small-stakes risk aversion begins with the 
assumption that an agent with (weakly) concave Bernoulli utility function will reject a small-
stakes gamble with even odds of winning or losing relatively small amounts, and that the agent 
will do this at all positive initial wealth levels.3 We examine the implications of this assumption: 
(a) when the prizes are amounts of terminal wealth; and (b) when the prizes are amounts of 
income.  
 
2.1. Implications for the Expected Utility of Terminal Wealth Model  
Consider the expected utility of terminal wealth model, the model based on the expected 
utility axioms and the assumption that the prizes are amounts of terminal wealth. An accessible 
demonstration of the logic of concavity calibration for a differentiable utility function is as 
follows. 
Assume that an agent rejects the gamble that involves a monetary gain of 110 and loss of 
100, with even odds, for all values of initial wealth w  greater than 100.4 According to the 
expected utility of terminal wealth model, a necessary condition for rejecting the gamble is that 
the increase in utility by having 110 more is not larger than the decrease in utility by having 100 
less, that is5 
(1) )100()()()110( −−≤−+ wuwuwuwu , for all 100>w .    
We shall show that statement (1) and concavity of )(⋅u  imply that an agent will reject any even 
odds gamble with a loss of at least 1,680 no matter how large is the gain amount. This 
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demonstrates how a pattern of plausible small-stakes risk aversion implies implausible large-
stakes risk aversion for this model. 
The driving mechanism of the concavity-calibration critique is that an implication of 
statement (1) and concavity of )(⋅u  is geometrically diminishing marginal utility:   
(2)  ( ) )(110/100)210( wutwu t ′≤+′ , for all w >100 and ⋅⋅⋅= ,2,1t      
In order to derive inequalities (2) first recall that, from the concavity of )(⋅u , any straight line that 
connects two different points on the graph of the function has a weakly larger (smaller) slope than 
the tangent line at the largest (smallest) point. Hence, }110/)]()110({[ wuwu −+  
)110( +′≥ wu and )100(}100/)]100()({[ −′≤−− wuwuwu . Therefore the term on the left-
hand-side of inequality (1) is at least )110('110 +wu  whereas the term on the right-hand-side is 
at most )100('100 −wu . Thus, inequality (1) and concavity of )(⋅u  imply that  
(3)  )100(100)110(110 −′≤+′ wuwu , for all 100>w .  
Inequality (3) shows that the marginal utility of getting ))100(110(210 −−+= ww  more 
money is not larger than )110/100(  times the marginal utility of the original amount. Since 
inequality (3) holds for all 100>w , it holds for 210+w  as well, and therefore the marginal 
utility at 210)210( ++w  is at most ( )110/100  of the marginal utility at 210+w , which is at 
most ( )110/100  of the marginal utility at .w  Thus the marginal utility at 2210×+w  is at most 
( )2110/100  of the marginal utility at .w  Continuing the argument, one finds that for any given 
positive integer t , the marginal utility at tw ×+ 210  is at most t)110/100(  of the marginal 
utility at w , and therefore inequality (2) is shown to hold.  
Implications of inequality (2) and global concavity of )(⋅u  are as follows. From 
concavity, the increase in utility from having 210  more than some initial wealth w  is bounded 
from above by 210  times the marginal utility at ,w  i.e. )(210)()210( wuwuwu ′≤−+ . 
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Similarly, if initial wealth is 210+w  then )210()2210( +−×+ wuwu  ).210(210 +′≤ wu  
The two immediately-preceding inequalities together with inequality (2), written for 1=t , imply 
the following inequality: ).(]110/1001[210)()2210( wuwuwu ′+≤−×+  Hence, by iteration 
≤−×+ )()210( wuJwu ).(])110/100()110/100(110/1001[210 12 wuJ ′+⋅⋅⋅+++ −  Note that 
the preceding summation in brackets can never be larger than 11 )).110/1001/(1( −=  This result 
and positive monotonicity of )(⋅u  imply: (*) the increase in utility from receiving any addition G 
to initial wealth w >100 can never be larger than )(]11210[ wu′× , which becomes 11210×  if we 
normalize the utility function so that .1)( =′ wu  On the other hand, for any positive integer k such 
that 100210 >− kw , writing inequality (2) for wealth equal to kw 210−  and 1=t  yields 
( )210)210( +−′ kwu  ( ) )210(110/100 kwu −′≤ . Hence the marginal utility at kw 210−  is at 
least )100/110(  of the marginal utility at 210210 +− kw  ))1(210( −−= kw . By repeating 
this argument, one finds that the marginal utility at kw 210−  is at least k)100/110(  of the 
marginal utility at w . Following the same logic as above, and for ,1)( =′ wu  one observes that 
the utility of 1210×  less than w  is at least 210 less than the utility of w; the utility of 2210×  
less than w  is at least )100/1101(210 + less than the utility of w, and by iteration the utility of 
K×210  less than w  is at least ])100/110(100/1101[210 1−+⋅⋅⋅++ K  less than the utility of 
w. The summation in brackets is strictly larger than 11 for all positive integers 7>K ; therefore 
11210)210()( ×>−− Kwuwu , for all such .K  This result and positive monotonicity of )(⋅u  
imply: (**) the decrease in utility from any subtraction 680,1≥L  ( 2108×= ) from initial wealth 
w > L is larger than 11210 × . Statements (*) and (**) and transitivity imply that the increase in 
utility from a gain of any amount G , no matter how large, is strictly smaller than the decrease in 
utility from a loss of 680,1 (or any larger loss) at any w bigger than the loss amount. This is a 
sufficient condition for rejection of any even-odds gamble, no matter how large the gain, that 
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involves a loss of 680,1 (or more). Therefore, the assumed pattern of plausible small-stakes risk 
aversion implies implausible large-stakes risk aversion for the expected utility of terminal wealth 
model. 
 
2.2 Implications for the Expected Utility of Income Model 
Now consider the expected utility of income model, the model based on the expected 
utility axioms and the assumption that the prizes are amounts of income (or changes in wealth). 
We shall demonstrate that the Rabin (2000) small-stakes risk aversion assumption does not imply 
implausible large-stakes risk aversion for this model.  
  Let μ  denote the agent’s Bernoulli utility function for income. A necessary condition for 
rejecting an even-odds gamble with loss amount  and gain amount g at all wealth levels >w  
is: 
(4) )()0()0()( −−≤− μμμμ g .   
It should be expected that the Rabin concavity calibration has no large-stakes risk aversion 
implications for this model because inequality (4) does not depend on w . In order to explicate 
comparison with the terminal wealth model, we consider the same small-stakes gamble as in 
section 2.1: receive -100 or +110 with even odds. An example of a Bernoulli utility function μ  
for income y that rejects the gamble with outcomes -100 or +110 with even odds, for all 
100>w , and has plausible large-stakes risk aversion is: 
(5)  1.09.0)( += yyμ , for 1<y , 
 9.0y= , otherwise.         
 Using utility function (5), define )(g  as the amount of gain that makes the agent 
indifferent between accepting and rejecting the even-odds gamble with loss amount ,  that is 
)(g  satisfies weak inequality (4) with an equality. Straightforwardly, if 1>  then 
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10
)9.01.0()( +=g  as a solution to the equation ( ) ( )1.0)(9.01.01.0)( 9.0 +−×−=−g . 
An even odds gamble with loss amount  and gain amount G will be rejected (accepted) for all 
gain amounts G strictly smaller (larger) than )(g . Hence, the even-odds lottery with outcomes 
of -100 and +110 is rejected since the gain amount 110 is strictly smaller than 149)100( ≈g . 
However, in contrast to the terminal wealth model, the agent with utility of income function (5) 
would accept an even-odds gamble with loss 1,680 and gain at least 3,412 since that is strictly 
larger than .411,3)680,1( ≈g 6 Thus, the assumed pattern of risk aversion over small-stakes 
gambles does not imply implausible risk aversion over large-stakes gambles with this expected 
utility model. 
  
3. Expected Utility of Initial Wealth and Income Model 
The expected utility of income model is widely used in the theory of auctions but this 
model does not provide an explanation of how an agent’s initial wealth affects its attitude towards 
risk. In this section we consider a model in which risk attitude depends on initial wealth but 
income is not additive to initial wealth.  
Assume that the arguments of the utility function are ordered pairs of initial wealth and 
income. Let υ  denote the agent’s “Bernoulli” utility function for initial wealth and income. For 
any integrable probability distribution function G  for random income y , the expected utility 
functional for this model is written as 
(6) )),,((),( ywEdGyw G υυ =∫        
where the function υ  is strictly increasing in both arguments and (resp. strictly) concave in its 
second argument if the agent is (resp. strictly) risk averse. Although, in this model, risk attitude 
depends on initial wealth, the model is not called into question by the type of global small-stakes 
risk aversion assumed in previous literature, as we shall now demonstrate. 
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3.1 Rationalizing Small- and Large-Stakes Risk Aversion 
For the model of initial wealth and income, a necessary condition for rejecting an even-
odds gamble with loss amount  and gain amount g  for all positive w  is 
(7) ),()0,()0,(),( −−≤− wwwgw υυυυ , for all .0>w       
We present an example of a “Bernoulli” function utility υ  that both satisfies inequality (7) for 
small-stakes risky lotteries and has plausible large-stakes risk aversion implications. To keep 
things comparable among the three expected utility models, we consider the same small-stakes 
gamble as in sections 2.1 and 2.2, the even-odds gamble with outcomes -100 and +110.  
Consider the following “Bernoulli” utility function υ  for initial wealth w  and income 
:y 7 
(8) 
( )
,1,
1
)1.09.0(),( 1.0 <
−
−+
=
−
−
y
e
eyyw
w
w
υ  
9.0)( wey −−= , otherwise.      
This utility function satisfies the pattern of risk aversion assumed by Rabin (2000) and at the 
same time it has plausible large-stakes risk aversion, as shown below. 
For the utility function (8), the amount of gain ),( wg  that makes the agent indifferent 
between accepting and rejecting the even-odds gamble with loss amount 1>  is given by 
),( wg ,])1/()1.09.0[( 9
101.0www eee −−− −−++=  which is derived by solving weak 
inequality (7) with equality. An even-odds gamble with outcomes −  and g+  will be rejected 
(accepted) for g  strictly smaller (larger) than ),( wg . Note that for initial wealth w >100 and 
loss amount ,100=  one has .149),100( ≈wg  Therefore ),100(110 wg<  for all w >100, 
which implies rejection of the even-odds gamble with outcomes -100 and +110. However, in 
contrast to the terminal wealth model’s prediction, the agent would accept an even-odds gamble 
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with loss 1,680 and gain at least 3,412 since 411,3),1680( ≈wg  for all .0>w  Thus the 
assumed pattern of risk aversion over small-stakes gambles does not imply implausible risk 
aversion over large-stakes gambles with the expected utility of initial wealth and income model.  
 
3.2 Comparative Risk Aversion 
Having observed that the expected utility of initial wealth and income model is not called 
into question by the type of global small-stakes risk aversion assumed in previous literature, the 
next question is whether this model can be used in applications in which the central questions are 
concerned with the implications of different attitudes towards risk and their possible dependence 
on initial wealth. We address this question by extending the Arrow-Pratt characterization of 
comparative risk aversion to the new model. 
The “Bernoulli” utility functions for two agents can be written as ),( ywjυ , for .,βα=j  
The measure of absolute risk aversion for this model is 
(9) 
),(
),(),(
2
22
yw
ywywA j
j
j
υ
υ
−= .  
Let y  be the mean value of income for the distributionG ; then the risk premium, jπ  is defined 
by 
(10) )),(()),(,( ywEGwyw jG
jj υπυ =− .   
Given that the function jυ  is strictly increasing in its second argument, y  there exists a y-
inverse function jφ  defined by 
(11) )),(,( ywwy jj υφ= .  
Define the function g  as follows: 
(12) )).,(,(),( uwwuwg βα φυ=  
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The measures of comparative risk attitudes for agents α  and β  are as given in the 
following proposition, which states that: (i) the absolute risk aversion measure for agent α is 
greater than the absolute risk aversion measure for agent β , if and only if, (ii) the risk premium 
for agent α  is greater than the risk premium for agent β , if and only if, (iii) the utility function 
for agent α  is a strictly increasing and strictly concave transformation of the utility function of 
agent β  of the form given by the definition in equation (12). 
 
Proposition 1. If αυ  and βυ are strictly increasing in y  and twice differentiable then the 
following statements are equivalent: 
(i) ),(),( ywAywA βα > , for all ),( yw ; 
(ii) ),(),( GwGw βα ππ > , for all w and G; 
(iii) )),(,(),( ywwgyw βα υυ = , 0),(2 >uwg , 0),(22 <uwg , for all ),( uw . 
Proof: See appendix B. 
Proposition 1 makes clear that the Arrow-Pratt characterization of agents’ comparative 
risk aversion can be extended from the expected utility of terminal wealth model to the two-
argument, expected utility of initial wealth and income model which is not called into question by 
Rabin’s (2000) concavity-calibration arguments. Hence, rather than using the expected utility of 
income model, agents’ risk-avoiding behavior can be modeled with the new model.8  
 
4. More Implications of Concavity Calibration for Decision Theory 
 
In sections 2 and 3, we demonstrated that the Rabin (2000) small-stakes risk aversion 
assumption has implausible large-stakes risk aversion implications for only one of the three 
expected utility models that we examined. This was the first question addressed in this paper. 
This section addresses another question: What are the possible implications of concavity 
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calibration for decision-theoretic models other than the expected utility of terminal wealth model? 
We present a concavity calibration proposition for functionals that represent preferences on a 
lottery space that may not be linear in probabilities (as are expected utility functionals). This more 
general concavity calibration proposition identifies small-stakes risk aversion assumptions for 
which all decision theories that involve concave transformations of positive money payoffs have 
implausible large-stakes risk aversion. This alternative pattern of small-stakes risk aversion may 
or may not have empirical validity, but the analysis makes it clear that the logic of concavity 
calibration has no unique implication for expected utility theory; either concavity calibration has 
no general implication for expected utility theory (because it does not apply to the expected utility 
of income model nor to the expected utility of initial wealth and income model), or it has 
problematic implications for all decision theories that involve concave transformations of positive 
money payoffs.  
 
4.1 Implications for Decision Theory of an Alternative Pattern of Risk Aversion 
Consider binary gambles that pay the amount of income x  with probability p  and the 
amount of income y  with probability ,1 p−  where ].1,0[∈p  Denote such a gamble by 
},;{ yxp . Consider a decision theory D that represents a preference ordering of these binary 
gambles with a functional ),( fhFD =  given as  
(13)  )())(1()()(),;( yfphxfphyxpFD −+= . 
That is, according to decision theory D, lottery },;{ bap=γ  is preferred to lottery },;{ dcq=δ  
if and only if ),()( δγ DD FF >  which using (13) can be written as 
(14) δγ  iff )())(1()()()())(1()()( dfqhcfqhbfphafph −+>−+ . 
For a functional representation ),( fhFD = , function h  is commonly called a probability 
transformation function and function f  is called a money transformation (or utility or value) 
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function. In the case of expected utility theory, the probability transformation function is the 
identity map: ,)( pph =  for all ].1,0[∈p   
We define a gamble },;{ gxxp +−  to be D-favorable if it satisfies 
(15)  xgxphxph >+−+− )))((1())(( . 
Then one has the following proposition.9 
 
Proposition 2. Let an agent’s preference ordering be represented according to some decision 
theory D by a functional ).,( fhFD =  Let g<<0  be given and f be increasing, concave and 
differentiable for positive amounts of money. Suppose that the agent prefers a certain positive 
amount of  money x to a D-favorable lottery },;{ gxxp +−  for all ).,( +∞∈x  Then 
according to decision theory D there exists a finite positive *L  such that for all *LL >  and 
Lz >  the agent will prefer the certain positive amount of money z  to lottery },,;{ GLzp −  for 
all G.  
 
Proof: See appendix C, part C.1. 
 
Interpretation of the definition of D-favorable lottery in inequality (15) for the special case of 
expected utility theory is that the gamble has positive expected value. In order to further explicate 
which lotteries are D-favorable, note that a risky lottery },;{ gxxp +−  is D-favorable if and 
only if ( ) .0)()(1 >×−−× phphg  Since the last inequality does not depend on x , one has: if 
},;{ ** gxxp +− is D-favorable for some ),(* +∞∈x  then },;{ gxxp +−  is D-favorable 
for all ).,( +∞∈x  
 
4.2 Interpretations with Alternative Decision Theories 
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We here offer some interpretations of Proposition 2 for models from two alternative 
decision theories, expected utility theory and cumulative prospect theory. First consider the three 
expected utility models discussed in sections 2 and 3 of this paper, the terminal wealth model, the 
income model, and the initial wealth and income model. Let the preference ordering over lotteries 
according to any of these three models be represented by the functional ),( UidE = , where 
id denotes the identity map which is the probability transformation for expected utility theory. 
The concave money payoff transformation function U is the Bernoulli utility function for 
income )(xμ , or terminal wealth )( xwu + , or initial wealth and income ),( xwυ , depending on 
which model is considered. Binary lottery }110,100;5.0{ +− xx  is an E-favorable risky gamble. 
For all three expected utility models discussed above, applying Proposition 2 and using the 
constructive proof in appendix C, part C.2, one has: rejection of this risky gamble in favor of a 
certain amount of income x, for all x >100, implies rejection of any even-odds lottery that 
involves a lower outcome less than z-1,680 in favor of receiving a certain amount z (z >1,680), no 
matter how large is the high outcome. An example is: 6,000 for sure is preferred to an even-odds 
lottery with low outcome of 4,000 and any arbitrarily-large high outcome. Thus we have the 
following corollary.  
  
Corollary 1. Any of the three expected utility models predict: if },110,100;5.0{ +− xxx  
,100>∀x  then 680,1≥∀L  and Lz >∀ , },;5.0{ GLzz −  for all G. 
 
Note that the examples of utility functions given in equations (5) and (8) do not satisfy the 
antecedent statement in Corollary 1 and, therefore, the corollary does not apply to those 
preferences. 
Next consider cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Let P = (W,v) 
denote the functional that represents the preference ordering according to this theory. Since all 
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outcomes are positive, the relevant money transformation function is the concave value function 
for gains and the relevant probability transformation function is given by the probability 
weighting function for gains ,+W  with 58.0)5.0( =+W  (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992, p. 312). 
First, consider the gamble }110,75;5.0{ +− xx . This gamble is P-favorable, as defined in 
statement (15), because xxx >++− )110(42.0)75(58.0 . Applying Proposition 2 for decision 
theory P (see appendix C, part C.3), one gets: if the certain amount of money x  is preferred to 
},110,75;5.0{ +− xx  for all ,75>x  then for all 850,1>L  and ,Lz >  the certain amount of 
money z  is preferred to },;5.0{ GLz −  no matter how large is G.10 The example reported for the 
expected utility models can be used here as well. That is, the derivation in part C.3 of appendix C 
implies that any even-odds gamble with lower outcome of 4,000, no matter how large the other 
outcome may be, is rejected in favor of receiving 6,000 for sure. Alternatively, consider the 
gamble }110,100;36.0{ +− xx . Gonzales and Wu (1999, p. 157) report on persistence across 
studies of the estimate ,5.0)36.0( =+W  and therefore the gamble }110,100;36.0{ +− xx  is P-
favorable as defined in statement (15). Applying Proposition 2, one finds that rejection of gamble 
}110,100;36.0{ +− xx  in favor of a certain amount of money x , for all 100>x , implies 
rejection of 0},,;36.0{ >∀− GGLz  in favor of receiving z  for sure, for all 680,1>L  and 
Lz >  (see appendix C, part C.3). Again, the example reported above survives (in a more extreme 
form): the gamble of receiving 4,000 with probability 0.36 or any positive amount with 
probability 0.64 is rejected in favor of receiving 6,000 for sure. The following corollary 
summarizes these findings.  
 
Corollary 2. Cumulative prospect theory P with the probability transformation function W, as 
reported in the literature, predicts: 
(i) if },110,75;5.0{ +− xxx  for all 75>x , then 850,1≥∀L  and Lz >∀  
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},;5.0{ GLzz − , for all G; 
(ii)  if },110,100;36.0{ +− xxx  for all 100>x , then 680,1≥∀L  and Lz >∀  
},;36.0{ GLzz − , for all G.  
 
Therefore, the presently-assumed global small-stakes risk aversion and concavity of the value 
function for positive amounts of money imply implausible large-stakes risk aversion with 
cumulative prospect theory.  
The assumption in Proposition 2 that an agent prefers the certain amount of money x to a 
D-favorable lottery },;{ gxxp +− , for all >g  and 0>>x , implies that the money 
transformation (utility or value) function f is bounded (see appendix C, part C.4).11  However, the 
implication of implausible large-stakes risk aversion in Proposition 2 and its corollaries does not 
require bounded money transformation functions. Implausible large-stakes risk aversion is also 
implied by an assumption that a certain amount of money x is preferred to a D-favorable lottery 
},;{ gxxp +− , for all x in a sufficiently large finite interval, and this alternative assumption 
does not imply bounded money transformation functions. (A proof of this alternative version of 
Proposition 2 is available upon request to the authors.) 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper explains that the type of global small-stakes risk aversion assumed in previous 
literature (Rabin, 2000; Rabin and Thaler, 2001) has no implication for the expected utility of 
income model, hence no general implication for expected utility theory. However, an agent’s risk 
attitude with the income model does not depend on initial wealth. This is our motivation for 
discussion of a two-argument model for which risk attitude does depend on initial wealth. We 
show that this model is immune to the concavity-calibration critique in previous literature. An 
 19
extension of the Arrow-Pratt characterization of comparative risk aversion to this new model is 
presented, demonstrating that this two-argument model may have fruitful applications. 
In order to explore the implications of concavity calibration for decision theory, we 
present a concavity calibration proposition that does not assume linearity in probabilities. This 
proposition, together with an alternative pattern of global small-stakes risk aversion, provides a 
concavity-calibration critique that applies to all expected utility models reported in this paper, to 
cumulative prospect theory, and to other decision theories that involve concave money 
transformation functions for positive money payoffs.12 The alternative assumed pattern of risk 
aversion holds in the domain of gains, which makes loss aversion irrelevant to the argument. This 
makes it clear that loss aversion does not provide a way around any problems for decision theory 
that follow from concavity calibration. This new pattern of small-stakes risk aversion, as assumed 
in Proposition 2, may or may not have empirical validity; the central role of Proposition 2 in the 
analysis is to make clear that concavity calibration has no unique implication for expected utility 
theory.13 Instead, concavity calibration either has no general implication for expected utility 
theory or it has problematic implications for all decision theories with concave transformation 
(utility or value) functions for positive money payoffs. 
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Endnotes 
 
1. Vickrey (1961) first developed Nash equilibrium bidding theory based on the expected utility 
axioms. He mainly developed the theory for the special case of risk neutral bidders, for which 
there is no essential distinction between the expected utility of terminal wealth model and the 
expected utility of income model. Later authors used the expected utility of income model to 
develop Nash equilibrium bidding theory for risk averse agents. See, for examples: Holt (1980), 
Harris and Raviv (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981), Cox, Smith, and Walker (1982), Milgrom 
and Weber (1982), Matthews (1983), Maskin and Riley (1984), and Moore (1984). The bid 
functions for risk averse bidders presented in these papers do not satisfy the best reply property of 
Nash equilibrium if one assumes that the argument of the utility function is terminal wealth rather 
than income. Appendix A provides an illustration.  
2. Loss aversion can be incorporated into a decision-theoretic model by assuming a utility or 
value function for income that has a kink at zero income and is steeper in the loss domain than in 
the gain domain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). While it has been featured in discussions of 
prospect theory, loss aversion is also consistent with the expected utility of income model and the 
new expected utility model introduced in this paper. 
3. Rabin (2000) examines the implications of rejection of this small-stakes gamble for all 
,Iw∈ where I  is either an infinite or sufficiently large finite interval. We focus on the infinite 
interval in order to simplify the exposition of concavity calibration.  
4. The wealth levels at which the small-stakes gamble is assumed to be rejected are required to be 
greater than the loss amount in the gamble (here, 100) because negative terminal wealth is not 
well-defined. 
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5. According to the expected utility of terminal wealth model, a necessary condition for rejecting 
gambles with outcomes x  and y−  at even-odds is )()(5.0)(5.0 wuywuxwu ≤−++ , which is 
equivalent to )()()()( ywuwuwuxwu −−≤−+ . Strict inequality gives a sufficient condition. 
We use this characterization for rejection (or acceptance for the opposite inequality sign) of even-
odds lotteries for the rest of the paper. 
6. Examples of other gambles that would be accepted include: }4150,2000;5.0{ +− ; 
}24760,10000;5.0{ +− ; and }.53470,20000;5.0{ +−  
7. This function is risk neutral for income less than 1, otherwise it exhibits absolute risk aversion 
(as defined in statement (9)) that is decreasing in both income and wealth. 
8. Note that, as presently developed this model shares some limitations with the expected utility 
of income model, prospect theory, and other models defined on income: it does not rule out 
certain types of anomalies (see Rubinstein (2004) for an illustration). Detailed analysis of 
possible “money pump” preference cycles and other violations of full rationality are beyond the 
scope of the present paper, which is concerned with the implications of concavity calibration for 
decision theories. 
9. Proposition 2 holds for non-differentiable f as well. Furthermore, implausible large-stakes risk 
aversion is implied even if small-stakes risk aversion is assumed to hold in a (large enough) finite 
interval instead of the infinite one. An alternative proposition (and proof) that relaxes 
differentiability of f and the infinite interval assumption is available upon request to the authors.  
10. The lower outcome Lz −  is required to be positive in order to make loss aversion irrelevant 
to the argument. 
11. We thank Martin Dufwenberg for bringing this to our attention. 
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12. An example of a decision theory that does not involve concave transformation of money 
payoffs is provided by Yaari’s (1987) dual theory of choice under risk. The “utility functional” 
that represents the dual theory preference ordering is always linear in money payoffs but is linear 
in probabilities only if the agent is risk neutral.  
13. The empirical credibility of Rabin’s (2000) risk aversion assumption is disputed in Palacios-
Huerta, Serrano, and Volij (2003) and in Cox and Sadiraj (2001). In ongoing empirical research, 
we are attempting to obtain data that can shed light on the empirical validity of Rabin’s 
assumption and the alternative risk aversion assumption in Proposition 2. 
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Appendix A. Bidding Theory for Risk Averse Agents Works with the Expected Utility of 
Income Model 
In order to appreciate that the terminal wealth model is not used in the literature on 
bidding theory, consider a special case example from the theory of first-price sealed-bid auctions 
of single items with independent private values (Cox, Smith, and Walker, 1982). Let private 
values be drawn from the uniform distribution on ]1,0[ . Let the preferences of 2 bidders be 
represented by the Bernoulli utility function for income :y  ryyu =)(  for ).1,0(∈r  Then the 
Nash equilibrium bid function is: )(∗ )1/( rvb ii += . Now consider the terminal wealth model 
instead. For this model the best reply property of Nash equilibrium is violated. Indeed, since the 
v–inverse of bid function )(∗  is ii brv )1( += , the probability that bidder 1 will bid less than 2b  
is 2)1( br+ , given that bidder 1 bids according to bid function ).(∗  Using the terminal wealth 
model, the expected utility of bidder 2 from bidding amount 2b  is 
.])1(1[)()1()( 22222
rr wbrbvwbrbU +−+−++=  It can be easily verified that )1/(22 rvb +=  
does not satisfy the first order condition for a maximum of )( 2bU  given that 10 << r . 
Furthermore, replacing iv  by ii vw + in bid function )(∗  does not yield a bid function with the 
mutual best reply property, nor does replacing iv  by ivw +  for the special case www == 21 . 
Examples using other Nash equilibrium bid functions in the literature lead to the same conclusion 
that the required best reply property is not satisfied if one uses the expected utility of terminal 
wealth model rather than the expected utility of income model.  
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Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 1  
Note that )),(,(),( ywwgyw βα υυ =  is true by construction (see statements (11) and 
(12)). Furthermore, ),,( ,0),(2 uwuwg ∀>  because 
βα υυ 222 g= , and 0),(2 >yw
αυ  and 
0),(2 >yw
βυ , ),( yw∀ .  
We first show that statements (i) and (iii) in Proposition 1 imply each other: (i) ↔  (iii). 
Differentiation of the functions in statement (iii) with respect to y  yields 
(b.1)  βα υυ 222 g= , and 
(b.2) ββα υυυ 222
2
22222 )( gg += . 
The definition of ),( ywA j  and statements (b.1) and (b.2) imply 
(b.3) 
( ) ( )
[ ]
( )
.     A                 
   
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
22
2
22
2
2
22222
22 β
α
αβ
β
α
β
β
α
α
β
βα
υ
υ
υ
υ
υ
υ
υ
υ
υ
υυ
A
g
g −=⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
−=
−
=  
Statement (b.3) implies that ),,( ,0),(22 uwuwg ∀<  if and only if 
).,( ),,(),( ywywAywA ∀> βα   
We next show that statement (iii) in Proposition 1 implies statement (ii) in the 
proposition: (iii) →  (ii). Jensen’s inequality and the definitions imply 
(b.4) 
)).,(()))),(,(,(())),(,((
))),((,()))),((,(,(
ywEywwwEywwgE
ywEwgywEww GG
αββαβ
βββα
υυφυυ
υυφυ
==>
=
 
Therefore 
(b.5) 
).,()())),((,(
))))),((,(,(,())),((,(),()(
GwyEywEw
ywEwwwywEwGwyE
GG
GGG
ααα
ββααβββ
πυφ
υφυφυφπ
−=>
==−
 
Therefore statement (iii) implies statement (ii) in Proposition 1.  
We next show that statement (ii) in Proposition 1 implies statement (iii) in the 
proposition: (ii)→  (iii). Statement (ii) and the definitions imply 
 27
 (b.6) 
)).,(()),()(,(
)),()(,()))),((,(,(
ywEGwyEw
GwyEwywEww
GG
GG
ααα
βαββα
υπυ
πυυφυ
=−>
−=
 
Hence 
(b.7) 
))).,(,(()))),(,(,(()),((
)))),((,(,())),((,(
ywwgEywwwEywE
ywEwwywEwg
GGG
GG
βββαα
ββαβ
υυφυυ
υφυυ
==>
=
 
Therefore, g  is strictly concave in ).,( ,0),(  : 22 uwuwgu ∀<  
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Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 2 and Corollaries 1 and 2  
C.1 Proof of Proposition 2 
Let a decision theory D with functional ),( fhFD =  be given.  Let money 
transformation function f have the following properties for positive amounts of money: 
increasing, concave and differentiable.  Let g<<0  be given. Suppose that the agent prefers a 
positive amount of money x  for sure to a D-favorable lottery, },;{ gxxp +−  for all 
).,( +∞∈x  This assumption and statement (14) in the text for decision theory D imply  
(c.1) )())(1()()()( gxfphxfphxf +−+−≥ , for all >x . 
We shall show that (c.1) and the concavity property of f  imply that for all positive z and 
positive integers j,  
(c.2) )(
)(1
)())(( zf
gph
phgjzf
j
′⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
−
≤++′ . 
Note that 1)( ≠ph  since },;{ gxxp +− is a D-favorable lottery.  
We shall also show that there exists a *K  such that for all positive integers *KK > , for 
all Kgz )( +> ,  
(c.3) [ ] [ ])())(())(1())(()()( zfJgzfphKgzfzfph −++−>+−− , 
for all positive integers .J  This will give us our result because statement (14) and inequality (c.3) 
imply that for all ,*KK >  and for all ,)( Kgz +>  the agent prefers the positive amount of 
money z  for sure to the lottery })(,)(;{ JgzKgzp +++−  for all J. This preference for z, 
together with positive monotonicity of ,f  implies Proposition 2 with ** )( KgL += . 
To derive (c.2), note that inequality (c.1) holds for all >x , and thus it holds for +z   
(c.4) )())(1()()()( gzfphzfphzf ++−+≥+ , for all positive z .  
Substituting )())(1()()()( +−++=+ zfphzfphzf in (c.4) and rewriting it, one has  
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(c.5) )]()()][(1[)]()()[( +−++−≥−+ zfgzfphzfzfph , for all positive z .  
Inequalities [ ] )('/)()( gzfgzfgzf ++≥+−++  and [ ] ),('/)()( zfzfzf ≤−+  
(both following from the concavity property of f ) and inequality (c.5) imply  
(c.6) )(
)(1
)())(( zf
gph
phgzf ′⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
−
≤++′ , for all positive z . 
Iterative application of the logic used to derive (c.6) implies 
),(
)(1
)()))(1((
)(1
)())(( zf
gph
phgjzf
gph
phgjzf
j
′⎟⎟
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⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
−
≤≤+−+′⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
−
≤++′ …  which  
gives statement (c.2).  
To derive statement (c.3) note that for all positive integers ,J  and for all positive z , one 
has 
(c.7) 
[ ]
,
)(1
)()()(
))(()(
))(()))(1(()())((
1
0
1
0
1
0
∑
∑
∑
−
=
−
=
−
=
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⎛
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−
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++′+≤
++−+++=−++
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j
j
J
j
J
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gph
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gjzfgjzfzfJgzf
 
where the first inequality follows from the concavity property of f and the second one follows 
from statement (c.2). Similarly, for any given positive integer K  and for all z  larger than 
,)( Kg+  
(c.8)  
kK
k
g
ph
phzfgKgzfzf ∑
−
=
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
×
−′+≥+−−
1
0 )(
)(1)()())(()( . 
Note that 0)( ≠ph  follows from inequality (c.1) and f being an increasing function.  Showing 
that there exists a positive *K  such that for all positive integers *KK > ,  
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(c.9) ))(1( ph− ∑
−
=
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⎠
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1
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0 )(
)(1
, for all ,1≥J  
completes the proof since then (c.7), (c.8) and (c.9) imply (c.3). Inequality (c.9) is a direct 
implication of the binary lottery },;{ gxxp +−  being a D-favorable one. Indeed, statement 
(15) in the text implies ( ) ( ) 1/))(1/()( <×− gphph , and hence for all values of J  the term on 
the left-hand-side of (c.9) is strictly smaller than the finite number S defined as 
( ) ⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
×
−
−−=⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
×
−
−≡ ∑
∞
= gph
phph
gph
phphS
j
j
)(1
)(1/)(1
)(1
)())(1(
0
; whereas the term on the 
right-hand-side of inequality (c.9) is unbounded from above as ∞→K  
(since ( )( ) 1)/()(/)(1 >×− gphph ). Therefore, there exists a positive integer *K  that makes 
the right-hand-side term in (c.9) larger than S , and hence strictly larger than the left-hand-side 
term for all J .  
 
C.2. Proof of Corollary 1  
For ,100= ,110=g 5.0=p  and 5.0)5.0( =h , one has 5.5=S , and the right hand side of 
inequality (c.9) is larger than 5.5  for all .8* =≥ KK  Hence, Proposition 2 applies with 
8)100110(* ×+=L . 
 
C.3. Proof of Corollary 2. 
Part (i). For this case, ,75=  ,110=g  5.0=p  and 58.0)5.0()5.0( == +Wh  and hence 
2.7≈S , and the right hand side of inequality (c.9) becomes larger than 2.7  for all 
10* =≥ KK . Then, apply Proposition 2 with 10)75110(* ×+=L . 
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Part (ii). For this case, ,100=  ,110=g 36.0=p  and 5.0)35.0()36.0( == +Wh , and one 
can verify that 5.5=S  and that the right hand side of inequality (c.9) is larger than 5.5  for all 
.8* =≥ KK  Then apply Proposition 2 with 8210* ×=L .  
 
C.4. Note about Bounded Money Transformation Functions  
Assumption (c.1) and concavity imply that function f is bounded from above as follows. For any 
given x , there exists a positive integer J  such that ( )( )Jgx ++≤ 1 , and therefore 
( )( )Jgfxf ++≤ 1)( . The right-hand-side of the last inequality is smaller than 
( )[ ])(1/)1()()1( phSfgf −′++   which follows from inequality (c.7) and the definition of .S  
Denoting the last expression by M, one has Mxf ≤)( for all x . 
 
